IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA **MACON DIVISION**

WILLIE FRANK WRIGHT, JR.,

Plaintiff

NO. 5:10-CV-272 (CAR)

VS.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 BEFORE THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Officer LANGFORD,

Nurse JAMMIE HARGROVEN.

and DR. THERONE HARRISON,

ORDER & RECOMMENDATION

Defendants

Plaintiff WILLIE FRANK WRIGHT, JR., a pretrial detainee at the Baldwin County Jail in Milledgeville, Georgia, has filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. He also seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the \$350.00 filing fee or security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Based on plaintiff's submissions, the Court finds that he is unable to prepay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** plaintiff Wright's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* and waives the initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is nevertheless obligated to pay the full filing fee as will be directed later in this order and recommendation. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the business manager of the Baldwin County Jail.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint "which seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted"; or (2) "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."

A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are "clearly baseless" or that the legal theories are "indisputably meritless." *Carroll v. Gross*, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include "enough factual matter (taken as true)" to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]" *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and that the complaint "must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action") (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice").

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." *Tannenbaum v. United States*, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *Hale v. Tallapoosa County*, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal. *See Chappell v. Rich*, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a section 1983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). *See also* 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in section 1915A "shall" be dismissed on preliminary review).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wright names as defendants Officer Langford, Nurse Jammie Hargroven, and Dr. Therone Harrison. He alleges that on May 6, 2010, Officer Langford handcuffed plaintiff too tightly and pulled on the handcuffs, resulting in plaintiff's wrist being fractured. When advised that the handcuffs were too tight, Officer Langford allegedly told plaintiff to "man up." Plaintiff claims he was thereafter placed in the hole with no pain medication and that Dr. Harrison waited 5 days to treat him. He was ultimately taken to an orthopedic physician who placed plaintiff's wrist in a brace. Plaintiff appears to complain that Nurse Hargroven prematurely removed the supports in the brace, although he states that Nurse Hargroven was acting on the recommendation of Dr. Harrison.

III. DISCUSSION

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by prison personnel may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, but only when it is "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." *Harris v. Thigpen*, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991). To prove he was denied medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must show (1) an objectively serious medical need that, left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) that the response made by public officials to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law. *Taylor v. Adams*, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); *Campbell v. Sikes*, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363-72 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that medical malpractice cannot form the basis for Eighth Amendment liability). A delay in providing medical treatment can constitute deliberate indifference. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

Plaintiff's claims against Nurse Hargroven do not allege a colorable claim of deliberate indifference. He indicates that Nurse Hargroven provided him with treatment and that she acted upon the recommendation of Dr. Harrison in removing the supports from plaintiff's brace. Thus, even if Nurse Hargroven had acted without the doctor's recommendation, at most, plaintiff has alleged mere negligence on her part. Negligence claims are not actionable under §1983, however. *See Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 88 L. Ed.2d 662, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 88 L.Ed.2d 677, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).

Accordingly, **IT IS RECOMMENDED** that Nurse Jammie Hargroven be **DISMISSED** from this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN** (14) **DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

Plaintiff Wright's claims against Officer Langford shall be allowed to go forward. Although the precise nature of his claim against Dr. Therone Harrison are unclear, construing the complaint liberally in favor of plaintiff, the complaint against Dr. Harrison shall also be allowed to go forward. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that service be made against OFFICER LANGFORD and DR. THERONE HARRISON, and that they file a WAIVER OF REPLY, an ANSWER, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE

During the pendency of this action, each party shall at all times keep the Clerk of this court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of his current address. FAILURE TO PROMPTLY ADVISE THE CLERK OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS MAY RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY'S PLEADINGS FILED HEREIN!

DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION

Plaintiff is advised that he must <u>diligently</u> prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to <u>diligently</u> defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.

FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND CORRESPONDENCE

It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of court; to serve copies of <u>all</u> motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence (<u>including letters to the Clerk or to a judge</u>) upon opposing parties or counsel for opposing parties if they are represented; and to attach to said original motions and pleadings filed with the Clerk a **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** indicating <u>who</u> has been served and <u>where</u> (i.e., at what address), <u>when</u> service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U. S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).

THE CLERK OF COURT WILL NOT SERVE OR FORWARD COPIES OF SUCH MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, AND CORRESPONDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES!

DISCOVERY

PLAINTIFF SHALL NOT COMMENCE DISCOVERY UNTIL AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION HAS BEEN FILED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS FROM WHOM DISCOVERY IS SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF. THE DEFENDANTS SHALL NOT COMMENCE DISCOVERY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION HAS BEEN FILED. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The deposition of the plaintiff, a state prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and interrogatories) shall be completed WITHIN 90 DAYS from the date of filing of an ANSWER or DISPOSITIVE MOTION by the defendant(s), unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90 DAY period shall run separately as to each plaintiff and each defendant beginning on the date of filing of each defendant's answer/dispositive motion. The scheduling of a trial herein may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.

NO PARTY SHALL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO ANY DISCOVERY NOT DIRECTED TO HIM OR SERVED UPON HIM BY THE OPPOSING COUNSEL/PARTY! The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the Local Rules imposing the following limitations on discovery: except with written permission of the court first obtained, INTERROGATORIES may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS under Rule 34 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS under Rule 36 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these limitations.

REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT

Dismissal of this action or requests for judgment will <u>not</u> be considered by the court absent the filing of a <u>SEPARATE MOTION</u> therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than **THIRTY (30) DAYS** after the close of discovery unless otherwise directed by the court.

DIRECTIONS TO CUSTODIAN OF PLAINTIFF

Following the payment of the required initial partial filing fee or the waiving of the payment of same, the Warden of the institution wherein plaintiff is incarcerated, or the Sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor custodians, shall each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this court twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's account at said institution until the \$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*, plaintiff's custodian is hereby authorized to forward payments from the prisoner's account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED that collection of monthly payments from plaintiff's trust fund account shall continue until the entire \$350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of plaintiff's lawsuit or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.

PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEE

Pursuant to provisions of the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*, in the event plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been paid in full; plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*. Collection from the plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit payments. In addition, plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal if he has the ability to make monthly payments and fails to do so.

ELECTION TO PROCEED BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Under **Local Rule 72**, all prisoner complaints filed under provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983 are referred to a full-time United States Magistrate Judge for this district for consideration of all <u>pretrial</u> matters. In addition, 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1) authorizes and empowers full-time magistrate judges to conduct any and <u>all</u> proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter <u>and</u> to order the entry of judgment in a case upon the <u>written consent</u> of all of the parties. Whether the parties elect to proceed before a magistrate judge or retain their right to proceed before a U. S. district judge is strictly up to the parties themselves.

After the filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants, the Clerk of court is directed to provide **ELECTION FORMS** to the parties and/or to their legal counsel, if represented. Upon <u>receipt</u> of the **ELECTION FORMS**, each party shall cause the same to be executed and returned to the Clerk's Office WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS. Counsel may execute **ELECTION FORMS** on behalf of their clients provided they have such permission from their clients. However, counsel <u>must</u> specify on the **ELECTION FORMS** on whose behalf the form is executed.

SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 3rd day of August, 2010.



CLAUDE W. HICKS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Marke W. Stepe

ADDENDUM TO ORDER

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY SET OUT ABOVE, NO DISCOVERY SHALL BE PERMITTED IN THIS CASE UNTIL AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION (e.g., MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS) HAS BEEN FILED BY THE DEFENDANT.

PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, DISCOVERY (DEPOSITIONS, INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, ETC., AND RESPONSES THERETO) SHALL NOT BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF COURT. NOTE THAT THIS IS A CHANGE IN THE PROCEDURE HERETOFORE FOLLOWED IN THIS DISTRICT.

DO NOT FILE ANY DISCOVERY WITH THE COURT UNLESS YOU ARE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO DO SO BY THE COURT OR UNLESS FILING IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OR CONTEST A MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY, DISPOSITIVE MOTION, OR SIMILAR MOTION. THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO RETURN ANY SUBMITTED DISCOVERY TO THE PARTY SUBMITTING IT UNLESS IT IS FILED PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF THE COURT OR IN SUPPORT OF A MOTION TO COMPEL, OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY, DISPOSITIVE MOTION, OR SIMILAR MOTION.